This paper examines the process of price discovery at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) single price opening auction. Interest in this topic is motivated by the crucial role played by opening mechanisms in information aggregation following the overnight non-trading period. In addition, the operation of auction markets is an issue of considerable importance for new, automated trading systems as well as extant exchanges. We show empirically that specialists significantly facilitate price discovery. Specifically, the opening price set by the specialist is more efficient than the price that would prevail in a pure auction with only public orders. This is consistent with a model where specialists learn from observing the evolution of the limit order book. The specialist's opening trade reflects private information and non-informational factors such as inventory control and price continuity. We discuss the empirical and policy implications of these results.
Introduction
In one of the world's earliest studies of securities markets, Confusion de Confusionés (1688), Joseph de la Vega described trading on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange 1 , concluding "On geographical maps fine dotted lines are drawn around undiscovered regions which are named Terra Incognita. On the Exchange, too, there are many secret operations which I have not been able to discover…."
Our knowledge of geography has advanced dramatically over the past three centuries, but as yet many fundamental questions concerning the operation of security markets remain unanswered. Some of the most important issues concern the process of price discovery in financial markets. This paper examines this issue using order-level data from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) single-price opening auction.
This topic is important for academic and practical reasons. A trading mechanism can be thought of as a set of protocols for translating investors' latent demands into prices and volumes. Trading mechanisms vary greatly in many dimensions, including their reliance on designated dealers and the extent to which they provide transparency. These differences complicate the task of analyzing the "black box" by which orders are translated into realized trades, a topic of considerable academic importance.
One objective of this study is to better understand how these aspects of mechanism design affect the process of price formation. formation. 2 The NYSE's single-price opening mechanism is of interest in itself given the high volumes at the open and the crucial role played by the specialist in price formation. Indeed, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (1963) noted that "the control that specialists have on prices is nowhere better illustrated than at openings." Concern about the market power of specialists and the frequency of opening delays have led to increased scrutiny of the NYSE's opening protocols. These issues are relevant for markets such as Nasdaq that currently lack special opening protocols. 3 Finally, the open is also worthy of study because the high volume of market-on-close orders results in a close that much resembles the open. There is consequently considerable interest in the micro-mechanics of the NYSE's opening system. We develop a model of a single-price call auction where a strategic market maker or specialist sets the opening price after observing the limit order book. The model is based on opening procedures at the NYSE. 4 We show that the specialist learns from the evolution of the limit order book. Strategic trading based on this information may result in more informative prices than would otherwise prevail in an auction without dealer intervention. However, specialist trading at the open is also affected by noninformation motives such as inventory control or exchange obligations, and these factors may add noise to the opening price. Thus, the net effect of dealer trading on price efficiency is an empirical question.
We test these hypotheses using data on orders submitted for the open for a wide cross-section of NYSE stocks. Order-level data are especially important for our analyses because the opening price is affected by all latent demands − not just orders that ultimately result in transactions. We use these data to compute the market-clearing price that would have prevailed in the absence of trading by floor participants. We compare this statistic to the actual opening price to make inferences about the information content of the limit order book and the ability of dealers to affect market prices. We also directly test the model's predictions regarding the specialist's strategic trading.
The empirical analysis yields several interesting results. Although almost all stocks could be traded at the open in a single-price auction − in the sense that a well-defined market clearing price exists based on public orders − this is not the case. Rather, single-price auctions are used at open for only two-thirds of stock-days in our sample. Auctions are rarely used to open thinly traded stocks, possibly because order imbalances have large impacts on auction prices. There is strong evidence that dealers facilitate price discovery at the opening by setting more efficient prices than would prevail in an auction using public orders.
The previous result raises several questions concerning the nature of specialist trading at the open. We show that the specialist's opening trade is informative in the sense that it is positively correlated with expected post-opening returns. This is consistent with our results suggesting that the price set by the specialist is more informative than the price that would prevail in his or her absence. We also find that specialist trading reflects price stabilization and inventory control motives. Interestingly, although specialist opening purchases (sales) are associated with positive (negative) returns, the returns themselves are not significantly different from zero. One explanation is that the specialist faces competition from floor brokers. Alternatively, specialist profits might be dissipated by losses from price stabilization arising from exchange mandated affirmative obligations.
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Our theoretical analysis provides insight into the operation of call markets (see Ho, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1985) , Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , and Wohl and Kandel (1997) ) and the strategic role of specialists (see, Madhavan and Smidt (1993) and Seppi (1997) ). It also sheds light on the relative merits of floor versus automated trading systems and the role of transparency, as discussed by Benveniste, Wilhelm, and Marcus (1992) and Domowitz and Wang (1994) . Our empirical analysis of the open is related to work by Garbade and Sekaran (1981) , Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (1998) , Brooks and Su (1997) , Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1998) and Kehr, Krahnen, and Theissen (1998) . It also complements analyses by Mendelson (1987, 1991) , Stoll and Whaley (1990) , Forster and George (1996) , and George and Hwang (1997) . Finally, our results provide some support for recent experimental evidence (Bloomfield and O'Hara, 1997; Schnitzlein, 1997) suggesting that mechanism design, and transparency in particular, can significantly affect the process of price formation. Finally, the results have direct policy implications regarding market structure, the design of opening protocols, and proposals for new trading systems.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model of an auction market that serves as the basis for our subsequent empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the relevant institutional features of the NYSE's open and our data sources and procedures. Section 4 contains our empirical analyses of the opening and the effects of dealer intermediation. Section 5 outlines the economic implications of our analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
The Analytical Framework

Notation and Assumptions
In this section, we develop a theoretical model of a single-price auction that yields explicit empirical hypotheses. We consider a market in which a single risky asset with unknown value is traded in a call auction mechanism. Trading is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, public investors submit price-contingent orders for execution at the open. 5 In the second stage, a designated dealer (or specialist) views the entire order book and strategically selects a single opening price, accommodating any excess demand from his or her own inventory. To focus attention on the nature of opening protocols, we do not model the subsequent continuous market. 
where we have normalized the interest rate on the riskless asset to zero.
There are two types of public investors: Informed traders and uninformed (liquidity) traders.
Informed traders obtain a private information signal about the liquidation value of the asset. Suppose the prior distribution of the unknown asset value, v, is normal with mean µ and precision (the inverse of the variance) ζ. Informed traders receive a signal, s, drawn from a normal distribution with mean v and 5 Prices and quantities are assumed to be continuous so investors submit price functions. See, e.g., Glosten (1994) . precision ψ. 6 Let Ω i denote the information set of informed trader i = 1, …, N; Using the properties of the normal distribution, conditional upon Ω i , trader i views v as distributed normally with mean
, where γ=ζ/(ζ+ψ), and conditional varianceσ
Informed traders are assumed to be price-takers, an assumption we discuss in more detail below.
Maximizing expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the certainty equivalent v q e c pe
Thus, an informed trader submits an opening order that is a linear function of price . Observe that the intercept reflects not only the trader's fundamental value but also the endowment hedging motive while the slope of the demand function is inversely related to the trader's risk aversion and to the uncertainty regarding private information. Thus, the order does not fully reveal the trader's information signal.
In addition to the N informed traders, K ≥ 0 uninformed investors trade for non-information or liquidity-based reasons, such as life-cycle consumption needs. We denote the trade of an uninformed trader j by x j with the sign convention that positive values imply share purchases while negative values imply sales. Consistent with the previous literature, we assume the demands of liquidity traders are exogenous, so that they trade using market orders. In what follows, we assume that traders' initial endowments are drawn from a normal distribution with a constant mean, normalized to zero. Note, however, that K may be zero in our model, because the hedging demands of informed traders provides the noise necessary to avoid market failure.
An Automated Call Market
Before turning to the second stage of the game where a strategic specialist sets the price, it is useful to examine an automated or fully electronic call market (see, e.g., Domowitz and Wang, 1994) without a designated dealer. Traders submit their orders electronically to an automated system that determines the price at which aggregate excess demand is zero, i.e., the classical Walrasian price. 6 We could extend the model to incorporate heterogeneous information signals but this does not alter the qualitative nature of our results.
From equation (3), the aggregate excess demand from public orders can be written as a function of price
where
. Let p* denote the market-clearing price in the automated call market, defined by the equation Q(p*) = 0. From equation (4), we obtain:
The market-clearing price is equal to value plus a mean-zero noise term, ω, that captures the effects of hedging of endowment risk and liquidity trading. It follows that the market-clearing price p* is an unbiased estimator of true value.
A Call Market with a Designated Market Maker
Market Maker Behavior
In some opening mechanisms, including that used by the NYSE, there is an additional stage of the game where a designated dealer or specialist selects the opening price (which need not necessarily be p*) and absorbs any excess demand or supply from inventory. To describe the process by which the specialist selects the price, we need to define more precisely the specialist's objective function. For now, we assume that there are no additional participants in the two-stage game. Later we relax this assumption to allow participation by floor traders.
Like public investors, the specialist maximizes a negative exponential expected utility function.
However, the specialist's decision problem differs from a public investor in important respects. First, the specialist is not a price taker instead viewing price as a choice variable. Second, the specialist is expected to "establish a fair opening price close to the prior day's last sale" to maintain price continuity. 7
There is no explicit rule about what constitutes continuity, but it is one of several criteria by which specialists are periodically evaluated. Consequently, substantial deviations between opening and closing prices are likely to adversely affect the specialist's reputational capital. Third, unlike public investors, the specialist sees the individual orders that constitute the aggregate excess demand function. As we will 7 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (1963) .
shortly see, the ability to observe the evolution of the limit order book confers an informational advantage over public investors.
Let W s denote the terminal wealth of the specialist and let z denote the specialist's trade, with the convention that z > 0 denotes specialist purchases and z < 0 denotes specialist sales. To model the effect of price continuity rules in the simplest possible way, we assume that the specialist faces costs from failing to maintain price continuity of the form − − δ( ) p p c 0 2 where δ > 0 is a constant and p c denotes the previous day's closing price. These costs are understood to represent the implicit costs arising from, say, the loss of reputational capital and the consequent loss of profits should the stock be re-allocated by the exchange to another specialist. Then, the specialist's post-trade wealth is given by
where c s represents holdings of the riskless asset, e s is the specialist's share inventory prior to the open, and p 0 (z) represents the opening price on the specialist's trade.
Specialist's Beliefs and the Limit Order Book
To describe the optimal actions of the specialist, we first need to describe the information content of the limit order book. Recall that the prior distribution of v is normal with mean µ and precision (the inverse of the variance) ζ. Suppose that observing the evolution of the limit order book provides the specialist with an information signal about asset value. Suppose further that this signal is normally distributed with mean v and precision π s , whose realization is y . Let Ω s denote the information set of the specialist given the limit book. Using the properties of the normal distribution, the specialist's posterior distribution of v is also normal with mean v E v s s
, where χ=ζ/(ζ+π s ). The conditional variance of the specialist's posterior is denoted by θ
The signal about value is based on seeing the evolution of the limit order book, i.e., based on observing the individual orders as they arrive in the book. Suppose initially that K=0, i. 
This statistic provides a noisy signal about the informed trader's private signal about the asset's value, s. 
Since s is a noisy signal of value, the precision of the specialist's information is π πψ π ψ s = + . This is clearly increasing in the precision term π.
The Value of Transparency
Observe that the ability to observe the individual orders constitutes a significant informational advantage. In particular, consider a trader who just observes the aggregate excess demand function 
This signal is normally distributed with mean s and precision
Comparing π and π′, we find that the precision of the transparent system is always greater than the precision of the non-transparent system, provided that at least two traders differ in their risk tolerances.
The idea behind this result is straightforward. For example, an order to buy a large-block of stock may be viewed very differently from, say, an order to sell an odd lot. In our model, an individual whose risk tolerance is high (manifested in the form of high price elasticity of demand) will not have a large portfolio hedging component to his or her trade. As a result, the specialist's statistical inference for this individual will be especially informative relative to others. Formally, if b i is high, the precision of the statistic y i is large. Simply observing aggregate demand does not allow the specialist to identify and filter out the more informative observations.
Transparency has another source of value as well. If K > 0, i.e., if there are uninformed traders, order form may convey information to the specialist regarding the asset's value. Formally, in a transpar-ent system where the individual orders are observed, the specialist can form the statistic y as described above. In a system where only the aggregate demand function is observed, the specialist observes only the statistic y. Although y is an unbiased signal of value, its precision is larger because the imbalances that are uninformative cannot be distinguished from price sensitive orders. Formally, the precision of the signal y is
which is strictly lower than before. It is for this reason, perhaps, that many call markets provide traders with information regarding imbalances arising from market orders. The arguments above demonstrate formally that there is a potentially large informational gain from observing the evolution of the limit order book prior to the opening.
The Behavior of a Strategic Specialist
Having described the process by which the specialist's beliefs are determined, we turn now to the problem facing a strategic specialist who sets the opening price. Market clearing implies that at the price selected by the specialist, denoted by p 0 , aggregate excess demand is zero. From the definition of aggregate demand and the market-clearing condition Q(p 0 ) + z = 0, we obtain the opening price as a function of the specialist's trade,
where p* is the market-clearing price automated call market and λ = 1 / ( ) 
where the coefficients β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 are positive constants given by β λ ρ θ
, and β δλβ
Equation (12) has a natural economic interpretation. The specialist's trade has three compo-nents. The first component represents the specialist's speculative motive for trading, and is proportional to the difference between the specialist's estimate of value and the market-clearing price in the specialist's absence. The second term represents the effects of inventory control. Other things equal, the specialist will sell to hedge a long opening inventory position and buy to hedge a short position. The third term captures the effects of exchange inducements to maintain price continuity. The importance of equation (12) lies in the fact that it is a natural candidate for empirical estimation using a regression model. This would allow us to make direct inferences regarding the three motivations for specialist
trading at the open identified by our theory. Estimation is, however, a non-trivial econometric problem, as we discuss later in Section 4 when we implement this test of the model.
Investor Strategies in a Specialist System
Observe that informed investors have some power to forecast the price set by the specialist based on their conjectures about his or her strategy. To see this, suppose that an informed investor does not observe specialist inventory and conjectures its mean is zero. Further, given our assumptions, the investor's conditional expectation of the difference between the specialist's value estimate v s and p* (both of which are centered on value) is also zero since the conditional expectation of both these variables is just v 0 . It is straightforward to show that the investor's conditional expectation of the special-
In other words, the specialist is expected to sell if the informed investor thinks that prices will rise from the previous day's close. Since this trade is not information motivated, it is analogous to specifying a non-zero mean for noise traders. The expected
) . However, since the demand functions characterized before are independent of the mean of the noise trading distribution, informed traders do not alter their demand functions in response to the specialist's presence in the two-stage game. This is because informed traders can condition their trade on all possible prices. Consequently, a trader will neither buy nor sell shares if the price is their reservation price.
It is clear, however, that the specialist's attempts to maintain price continuity will slow the adjustment of prices at the open, allowing for profitable trades by agents, such as floor traders, who need not possess private information. In section 2.4 below, we extend the model to allow for strategic traders who have rational conjectures about the specialist's actions.
The Informational Efficiency of Prices
The model also sheds light on the informational efficiency of prices set by the specialist to the price relative to the price in an automated call market. To do this, it is useful to examine the pricing error, i.e., the noise added by the trading process. We define the pricing error to be the deviation between the price and the value estimate based on the finest available information set, i.e., that of informed traders. Observe that the (unconditional) variance of the pricing error in the automated call market without dealer intervention is
where ω is the noise term defined above. Similarly, the (unconditional) variance of the pricing error at the open is
This equation shows that the variance of the opening price relative to asset value is the sum of three terms: (a) the noise around the Walrasian price, (b) the variance of the specialist trade, and (c) the covariance between the specialist's trade and the noise induced by non-informational trading.
Comparing the variance of the two pricing errors, we obtain a measure of the informational inefficiency of the opening auction relative to the automated market:
The specialist's trade has positive unconditional variance arising from inventory hedging and price stabilization. This term adds to the inefficiency of the opening price relative to the Walrasian price. The second term, however, may mitigate this if the specialist is the contra-party to imbalances arising from noise traders, inducing a negative covariance. From a theoretical viewpoint, the difference in equation (15) may be positive or negative. To see this, first consider the case where the specialist is risk neutral and the costs to maintaining price continuity is small so that the speculative motive is the only reason for trade. In this case, it is easy to show that the specialist's trade offsets, in part, the imbalance arising from liquidity motivated traders. Consequently, the specialist's actions will move price towards value, increasing informational efficiency. On the other hand, if inventory and continuity considerations are important but the specialist's information is poor, specialist trading is non-information motivated. In this case, the addition of noise to the price discovery process produces less efficient prices. Thus, the extent to which specialist trading facilitates the process of price discovery is an empirical one.
Strategic Traders
We assumed so far that the number of outside investors was the same in the electronic call and specialist markets to better compare the two systems. But the specialist system differs from an electronic market because strategic floor traders and speculators (see, e.g., Werner, 1998) may have incentives to trade even if they do not receive private information signals. In this section, we extend the basic model to allow for additional market participants. In the first stage, as before, off-floor traders submit market and limit orders to the specialist. Active floor traders or speculators then observe an indicated or hypothetical market clearing price based on the public limit order book. Active traders then submit their demands directly to the specialist. Finally, the specialist sets price after observing all orders submitted for execution.
Formally, suppose H+1 strategic traders or speculators observe the indicated price p* disseminated by the specialist given the orders submitted from off-floor traders. Traders are strategic in that they recognize their influence on the opening price. To focus attention on the role played by strategic traders, we assume that informed traders have the same risk tolerance, ρ, there are no noise traders, i.e., K = 0, floor participants have diffuse priors, i.e., ζ is small, and the specialist's inventory is zero.
Upon observing the indicated price p*, it follows that floor participants (including the specialist) view the prior distribution of v as normal with mean p*. The presence of speculators will alter the specialist's strategy from that described above. Suppose trader h conjectures that the specialist's trade is now of
, where Q -h is the net excess demand of the other H traders, q h is trader h's demand, and k is the positive constant described above. We will show that this conjecture is correct in equilibrium.
The expected price is then
Assuming that speculators have zero inventories, the expected utility of a trader h is
where the term σ h 2 is the variance of the pricing error v−p 0 from the viewpoint of trader h, which depends on the precision of the information signal. Maximizing this expression (Note that 1 > λk.) with respect to the trader's quantity q h we obtain 
It is straightforward to now check that given the traders' strategic order, the specialist's optimal action is of the form conjectured. To verify this, note that the opening price if the specialist trades a quantity z is
where the term in brackets is now the market-clearing price in a specialist system with active floor traders. Thus, the specialist's utility maximization problem has the same form as before and the optimal trade is given by equation (12), except that p* is replaced throughout by
Consequently, the expected order from the viewpoint of an outsider (who does not observe inventory or the specialist's own information signal) is indeed of the form conjectured. This characterizes the equilibrium with strategic traders.
This extension yields several insights into the nature of the two-stage system. First, from equation (19) we see that speculators will place buy (sell) orders if the price is expected to rise (fall) at the open relative to the previous day's close. This is profitable because the specialist is selling (buying) to maintain price continuity, depressing (elevating) prices. Second, speculators profit from interim announcements of indicated prices even though they themselves do not possess private information. This may explain why specialists are reluctant to disseminate information on the limit book more widely. It also implies that volumes will be higher in a specialist system than in a pure automated call market.
Third, note that because strategic traders trade in the opposite direction of the specialist, their expected profits are the specialist's losses. If the specialist has private information, trading against the specialist may not be optimal. However, on the NYSE, floor traders can compete with specialists directly by placing orders or through so-called percentage orders that allow them to participate on the specialist's side of the market. These orders compete directly with the specialist, reducing the specialist's profits.
In summary, the disclosure of market information and the presence of floor traders increase the costs of stabilization, reducing specialists' profits. So, although specialists' enjoy considerable privileges at the open through their unique position and ability to set price, these factors do not necessarily give rise to economic rents.
Summary and Discussion
The theoretical model described above yields several new results we summarize and discuss in this section. Our main findings are as follows:
• There is a potentially large informational gain from observing the evolution of the limit order book prior to the opening. This gain comes from observing the individual demand functions of traders and also the aggregate imbalance arising from market-on-open orders.
• The opening price set by a strategic specialist reflects information obtained from observing the evolution of the limit book as well as non-information factors such as inventory and price continuity. Specialist trades are positively related to the information component and negatively related to inventory and to the change from the previous day's close.
• The variance of the opening price relative to asset value is the sum of three terms: (a) the noise around the Walrasian price, (b) the variance of the specialist trade, and (c) the covariance between the specialist's trade and the noise induced by non-informational trading.
• The specialist's informational advantages can lead to more efficient prices than in a pure auction, but non-information trading could reverse this result.
• Dissemination of indicated prices allows relatively uninformed speculators to place profitable orders, increasing the costs of stabilization for the specialist.
Before moving to the empirical analysis, it is helpful to discuss the model's underlying assumptions as far as they relate to the empirical analysis. A key assumption in the model is that traders can submit price schedules, obviating the need to forecast the specialist's pricing choice, as noted above. In reality, traders submit rectangular demand functions and thus may trade using market orders if they are sure that they want to be on a certain side of the market irrespective of the opening price. This is possible since the NYSE will allow for order cancellation or revisions if the price will significantly depart from the previous day's close. If so, a proxy for p* based on order level data is most meaningful for opening prices within a range around the previous day's close. We discuss this point further in the empirical section.
Another key assumption is that traders act as price takers. In a small stock, where the number of traders placing orders is small, each trader has an influence on the specialist's beliefs and hence on price. In this case, traders may breakup their orders or use combinations of limit and market orders to confound the specialist's inference problem. Thus, our model should be interpreted as applying to active stocks where large numbers of traders participate at the open.
Finally, in our model the specialist's informational advantage came from the ability to observe incoming orders. However, that there are other avenues by which the specialist might obtain informa-tion. Benveniste, Wilhelm, and Marcus (1992) argue that the specialist can make inferences about the likelihood of a trader having private information based on their identity or that of their broker. Further, the specialist can observe demand conditions in the market as a whole, as discussed in Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Wohl and Kandel (1997) . Specialists often cite factors peculiar to the floorsuch as the ambient noise level -as important elements in their trading decisions. We can extend the model to incorporate information signals to the specialist arising from other than the order flow without altering our general conclusions.
Institutions and Data
Opening Procedures on the NYSE
The theoretical model developed in the previous section corresponds closely to the actual institutional structure of the NYSE, but there are some subtleties of the exchange's protocols that require more detailed discussion. Trading on the NYSE takes place between 9:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time), Monday to Friday. After the opening, the NYSE operates as a continuous auction with a designated dealer or specialist who is at the center of trading on the exchange. The specialist receives all market orders and maintains the public limit order book. In addition, the specialist also supervises the trading process, matches buyers and sellers, acts as an agent for other brokers, and exercises crowd control to ensure price and time priority and efficient order representation.
Floor brokers may (with the specialist's consent) view the limit order book, but it is not widely displayed thereby conferring an informational advantage to the specialist. 8 Yet despite the specialist's prominent position on the exchange, most trading on the exchange is between public investors without specialist intermediation. Indeed, in recent years, the specialist participation rate (defined as total specialist share purchases and sales in all stocks divided by total NYSE share volume) has averaged about 18 percent. 9
Opening protocols on the NYSE are different from the continuous trading system in many important respects. The NYSE's Opening Automated Report Service (OARS) stores the overnight accumulation of orders submitted electronically through the SuperDOT system. As orders are received, 8 NYSE Rule 2115 requires specialists to disclose the contents of the electronic limit order book to a floor broker who requests it, provided that the order's submitter has authorized disclosure.
OARS continually matches ("pairs") buy and sell orders. In addition to system orders, floor brokers (the "crowd") who want to participate at the open give their pre-opening orders to the specialist who enters these into OARS. Floor brokers can give the specialist two types of orders for execution without being physically present: (a) standard limit orders, and (b) percentage ("participation") orders. Percentage orders allow the floor trader to participate in a selected percentage of the specialist's own trade. Sofianos and Werner (1997) report that most orders left with the specialist are percentage orders, suggesting that floor traders view specialist's opening trades as profitable. Floor brokers may also participate actively at the open by standing at the specialist post in which case, they might not necessarily submit their orders through OARS. Sofianos and Werner (1997) report, however, that the value of broker executed active trades at the opening (i.e., excluding OARS) for all stocks is just 0.9 percent, although the overall figure in continuous trading is 35%.
At the open, the specialist sets a single opening price at which the accumulated order imbalance from market-on-open and public limit orders must be absorbed by the crowd and the specialist's inventory. It is important to note that the specialist is not required to act as an auctioneer, but can actively trade for his own account. In an illiquid stock, where the limit order book is especially thin, the specialist may open trading by simply posting a bid and offer price based on the limit order book or his own willingness to trade.
The specialist has an "affirmative obligation" to provide price continuity and maintain liquidity.
Although there are no explicit penalties for violating this obligation, a specialist's repeated failure to adhere to these guidelines could ultimately be penalized in several forms, including reassignment of stocks, the failure to be allocated new, profitable stocks, or censure.
The specialist can delay (subject to approval by a designated floor official) the opening or temporarily halt trading. Such a delay requires unusual circumstances, such as a "news pending" announcement or large imbalances. During this delay, non-binding quote indications are usually issued on the tape to signal the source of the delay and to attract contra-party interest from the crowd.
Data Sources and Procedures
TORQ Data
The data for this study are drawn from the Trades, Orders, Reports, and Quotes (TORQ) database, that is publicly disseminated by the NYSE. The TORQ data includes all trades, quotes and system orders for a randomly selected set of 144 securities for the period November 1990 to January 1991. 10 System orders include all orders placed through the NYSE's automated trading system, SuperDOT. In addition, the database provides details on the identity of members behind each trade from the NYSE's audit trail data, the Equity Consolidated Audit Trade (CAUD) file. Specialist trades, however, are not directly identified, although they may be inferred as discussed later. Of special interest, the TORQ data provide us with a complete representation of all orders (including public limit orders and market-on-close orders) entering the system prior to the opening, with fields indicating type and whether they represent buy or sell orders. Order information is vital for our study because the opening price will typically reflect the influence of all buy and sell orders, not just those that actually receive execution.
We construct the limit order book at the opening for each day for each stock as in Kavejecz (1997) . The procedure involves four stages: In stage one, we identify all limit orders that were submitted prior to the sample period. These orders either appeared as pre-opening orders on the first day of the sample period, or were "backfilled" using cancellations or trades that had no corresponding submissions in the sample period. In stage two, we identify all order submissions during each day of the sample period. In stages three and four, we record trades and cancellations for each day respectively.
Thus the limit order book at the opening included orders that were submitted but not canceled or filled prior to the opening. Except for limit orders placed far away from current market prices, this procedure captures all other limit orders that enter the SuperDOT system.
To better understand the nature of the data and this procedure, it is useful to examine a specific example. Figure 1 shows the aggregate demand and supply schedules for Boeing Aircraft (BA) on January 24, 1991 constructed using limit orders entering the SuperDOT system. Unlike the standard Marshallian cross, the supply and demand schedules are plotted as a function of price, so that the verti- 10 The four files that form the TORQ data are: the Consolidated Transactions file (CT), the Consolidated Quotes file (CQ), the System Order Database file (SOD) and the Consolidated Audit Trail file (CD). For a detailed description of the TORQ database, see Hasbrouck (1992) .
cal difference between the two lines represents excess demand or supply at that particular price. It is clear that the price at which absolute excess demand is smallest is at $48.50.
System-clearing Price
The NYSE floor official's manual specifies that all pre-opening orders must be entered into the system prior to the determination of the opening price by the specialist. Consequently, we can construct an analog to the Walrasian price, the system-clearing price. While this concept is clear from the example of Figure 1 , its implementation requires some care. We use the following algorithm to compute the system-clearing price:
For each stock and each day in the sample, all eligible pre-open market-on-open and limit buy and sell orders are identified. Error or canceled orders are deleted, as are orders without volumes. Market buy orders are assigned an arbitrarily high price p while market sell orders are assigned a limit price of zero. We exclude days when the opening is delayed and/or trading halted by a floor official.
(ii) For a price, p, in the discrete pricing grid P = {0, d, 2d,…, p }, where d is the minimum tick, the cumulative demand is defined to be the total buy-side volume (as indicated in the TORQ data) at price p or lower; for sells, cumulative supply is the total volume offered at p or higher. For every possible price p ∈ P we compute excess demand, Q(p), defined as the difference between cumulative demand and supply at that price.
(iii) A clearing price is a price at which absolute excess demand over all p ∈ P is minimized. Formally, p* is a clearing price if |Q(p*)| is smallest for p* ∈ {0,…, p }. Let C denote the set of clearing prices.
(iv) If C contains a single price p* it is defined to be the system-clearing price. Otherwise, the system-clearing price is defined as follows: If Q(p) < 0 for all p ∈ C, the system-clearing price is defined to be the lowest price contained in C. If Q(p) > 0 for all p ∈ C, the system-clearing price is the highest price in C. If Q(p 1 ) > 0 and Q(p 2 ) < 0 for two prices in C (where p 1 is the highest price in C for which excess demand is positive and p 2 is the lowest price for which excess demand is negative), the system-clearing price is (p 1 + p 2 )/2.
The system-clearing price is said to be undefined when there are no eligible pre-open orders:
(1) On either the buy-side of the book, the sell-side, or both, and/or (2) the price defined in
Step (iv) above is either 0 or p .
The procedure above yields a unique system-clearing price provided there are eligible preopening orders on both sides of the book to make this economically meaningful. Observe that the demand and supply schedules are step functions, so it is possible that there are multiple prices that qualify as clearing prices. Rule (iv) breaks ties by equating the system-clearing price with the lowest possible clearing price when there is excess supply and the highest clearing price when there is excess demand.
In the unlikely event that there are two prices at which excess demand is exactly equal to excess supply, the clearing price is the average price. Similarly, Rule (v) ensures that the system-clearing price, if it exists, is economically meaningful.
In the example given in Figure 1 , the (unique) system-clearing price is $48.50, since absolute excess demand is the smallest at this price. It is important to note that the system-clearing price is not necessarily the opening price, which is set by the specialist. In the example above, the specialist opened
Boeing at a price of $47.50, i.e., almost 2 percent less than the system-clearing price. At the opening price, there is excess demand for 11,380 shares, which was presumably provided by the specialist from inventory or by active floor broker trades.
Why did the specialist set price well below the market clearing price? One possibility is that the specialist, concerned about price continuity, set price close to the previous day's close of $47.125.
Alternatively, the specialist may have set price based on the information content of the limit book. To placed by non-information motivated traders, the limit-clearing price will have greater informational content than the system-clearing price. Given the supply and demand schedules, the limit clearing price in the example given above is $47.25. It is possible then that the specialist for BA set price below the system-clearing price because he or she viewed the order imbalances arising from market-on-open orders as uninformative.
In this particular case, however, the specialist's actions did not contribute to price discovery.
Specifically, the midquote at 3:00 p.m. on January 24 was $49.375, closer to the system-clearing price than the opening price. We will examine whether this is an isolated instance or is typical of a more general pattern where specialist actions add noise to prices.
Discussion
Implicit in the computation of the system-clearing price is the hypothesis that traders would not alter their behavior if the specialist did not trade. This is reasonable for a system where traders submit limit orders prior to the open (and hence condition on price), but may not be the case in a transparent auction (e.g., the Paris Bourse) where the limit order book is displayed to traders. In the latter case, traders may strategically cancel orders or delay placing orders as they observe the process of price formation, possibly yielding a different market-clearing price. This is possible on the NYSE only when there are large differences from the previous day's close, an issue we explicitly address in our empirical analysis.
While the NYSE is not a transparent market, the additional presence of floor traders who understand the specialist's trading strategy complicates matters. In particular, the system-clearing price is computed using all orders in OARS, and thus omits the influence of active floor broker orders. 11 From a theoretical perspective, as shown in Section 2.4, speculative trades originating from active floor traders will change the market clearing price from p* to p q h
Since active floor trades are not observed, the system clearing price we compute is more representative of the price that would prevail in a pure or automated auction. Thus, the system-clearing price is meaningful when interpreted as the price that would prevail in a non-transparent single-price auction, without trading from the exchange floor.
As a practical matter, Sofianos and Werner (1997) find that the magnitude of active floor broker trading is just 0.9 percent of value. However, for the smaller stocks, floor broker participation is higher, especially so in the bottom two size deciles where the corresponding figures are 16.9 and 26.8 percent, respectively. Thus, our conclusions regarding specialist trading are most appropriate for the more active stocks, and henceforth our discussion is primarily focused on the more active deciles.
Identification of Specialist Trades
The system-clearing price defined above does not require any knowledge of specialist trades.
However, some of our analyses require data on specialist transactions. We identify specialist trades in the TORQ data using the algorithm originally developed by Edwards (1997) and later refined by Panchapagesan (1997) . The idea behind the algorithm is straightforward. The TORQ data includes detailed information on the identity of traders in its audit file. Unlike the original audit trail data with the NYSE (CAUD), this information is only partially complete as certain traders' identities, including those of the specialists, are left blank. This makes it possible to use the omission of a trader identity code to flag such transactions as possibly involving the specialist. Using filters based on prior knowledge of the CAUD file, and the NYSE's policies and procedures, we develop an algorithm to identify specialist trades. It should be emphasized that the algorithm for identifying specialist trades is quite distinct from the procedure used above to determine the system-clearing price.
Audit-Trail Data
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to understand how audit information is presented in the TORQ database and in the CAUD. Hasbrouck, Sofianos and Sosebee (1993, (2) The specialist account type 'S' is not included while all other account types are included in the TORQ data; (3) Crowd trades-including specialist trades-have no identifiable source ("BTYPE" or "STYPE") in the TORQ data unless they trade with SuperDOT orders. In such cases, their source is L2 (for trades with limit orders) or D2 (for trades with market orders).
Representation of a Sample Trade in the TORQ File
An Algorithm for Identifying Specialist Trades
The two data fields identifying the specialist in the original CAUD are the badge field and the account type. As seen in the above example, only one of the two − the trader's account type − is available in the TORQ data. Using the account type and the order's source, we can identify potential specialist trades in the TORQ data.
To explain how the algorithm works, consider trades where the specialist could have been a possible buyer. Since the problem of identification is symmetric, the description applies to specialist sales as well. The algorithm identifies only the proprietary trades of the NYSE specialist at the NYSE. 12 NYSE Rule 132 mandates the provision of account information for audit trail purposes by all traders. Therefore, account types cannot be missing in the audit data unless they were systematically excluded. Since the specialist's account type ('S') is missing in the TORQ data, the necessary condition for a specialist buy is that the buyer account type ("BUYACCT") should be blank. Additional refinements are needed because account types can be missing for non-specialist trades as well. These are discussed in detail in Panchapagesan (1997) . Formally, the algorithm identifies specialist buys (sells are symmetric) in the TORQ audit data as records where: (1) Account type ("BUYACCT") is missing, (2) Source ("BTYPE") is D2, L2 or blank, and (3) Any Intermarket Trading System (ITS) trades ("BTYPE" = I1 or I2) must not have records in the System Order Database (SOD) file included with TORQ.
To the extent that the TORQ database was constructed in the manner conjectured, the algorithm should be highly accurate since the data are extracted from the NYSE's own audit-trail records. 13 Panchapagesan (1997) examines three different sources that use validated specialist trade data to 12 The audit information is incomplete for trades reported by other exchanges. This algorithm will therefore not capture trades of NYSE specialists routed through other exchanges. However, such trades are likely to constitute a low percentage of their total trades. 13 Conversations with exchange officials suggest that this is the case.
benchmark the algorithm. In particular, the algorithm yields a volume-weighted specialist participation rate of 16.3 percent for the 144 TORQ stocks as compared to 19.8 percent for all NYSE stocks, as reported in the NYSE Fact Book (1991) . Panchapagesan (1997) shows that the implied participation rate in TORQ stocks is similar to that reported by Madhavan and Sofianos (1997) and demonstrates the same patterns across stocks. Additional specialist trading statistics such as the stabilization ratio and price position of specialist trades are also compared and shown to be similar to those reported in the NYSE Fact Book (1991) and Sofianos (1995) .
We use this procedure to identify all specialist transactions, including the open, for all stocks in the TORQ data. We compute a constructed opening share inventory for each day and each stock as the sum of all signed specialist trades. It should be noted that the specialist's actual inventory level at the start of the sample is not observed, so that the constructed inventory is correct up to an unknown constant. percent over all stock-days in the sample. In the remaining 33 percent, the market opens with a two-sided quotation representing public limit orders or the specialist's own willingness to trade. However, as shown in the table, the reliance on batch mechanisms monotonically increases with trading activity.
Empirical Results
Is an Automated Call Market Feasible at the Open?
Descriptive Statistics
Operation of the NYSE Opening
In the top decile, a call market is used in virtually all cases, while in the smallest decile, it is used on only 20 percent of stock-days. Table 2 also reports the frequency with which the specialist delayed the quote. Delays are relatively small (0.8 percent of all stock-days) and do not appear to be systematically related to trading activity.
Occurrences are equally split between so-called "news pending" announcements and halts caused by imbalances. Although these events are interesting, the frequency of delayed openings in our sample is too small to permit a meaningful statistical analysis of the open at these times. Since our focus is on the operation of the call market on "normal" trading days, in what follows we restrict attention to openings that are not delayed or halted. Of special interest, the system-clearing price is defined in 92 percent of all stock-days, although a call market is actually used in only 67 percent of stock-days. There is no systematic pattern in the viability of a pure auction that is discernible across deciles of trading activity. These results are important because they suggest that an automated call market (without dealer intervention) could function as a viable alternative to the existing NYSE protocols for most stocks without significant delays. The percentage of stock-days (with call auctions) when the specialist traded at the open is inversely related to trading activity in the stock. Table 2 also shows that the mean order imbalances (market-on-open buy and sell share volume, divided by two) account for a significant fraction of the opening share volume, approximately 40 percent for all stocks in the sample.
Dealer vs. Batch Mechanisms
Dealer Trading Behavior
An Econometric Model of Price Formation at the Open
Our theoretical model demonstrates that the specialist's optimal action at opening is a function of three factors: the information provided by the limit order book, the specialist's inventory position, and exchange mandated price continuity rules. In this section, we develop an econometric model to test these predictions and hence assess the net effects of dealer actions at the open.
Although the inventory and price continuity factors can readily be estimated, econometric tests of dealer behavior are complicated because we do not observe the dealer's estimate of fundamental value. It is tempting to simply use an estimate of future value in equation (12) as a proxy for the specialist's conditional expectation and estimate the model using ordinary least-squares. However, this could induce an errors-in-variables problem that might bias all the OLS coefficient estimates. Fortunately, there is a solution to this problem in the form of instrumental variables estimation.
Let X denote a vector of state variables that are observed by the specialist prior to determining the opening price. For example, state variables may include market order imbalances at the open, the previous day's close, and the system-clearing price. We model the specialist's beliefs as a linear function of the state variables; the specialist's trades as described by equation (12). This yields the linear system:
Our model implies the coefficients in equation (21) have the following signs: β 1 > 0, β 2 < 0, and β 3 < 0.
The equation system (20)-(21) can be jointly estimated using an instrumental variables (IV) estimator; under assumptions of normality for the disturbance terms, full-information maximum likelihood is asymptotically the most efficient IV technique. (difference between buy and sell volume relative to average daily share volume), the system clearing price, and the previous day's close. We use the same-day 3:00 p.m. midquote price as the benchmark future value. We selected the 3:00 p.m. midquote because of the possibility that the specialist may "validate" his or her choice of the opening price over short horizons. Garbade and Sekaran (1981) discuss this issue, but conclude it "appears unlikely that a specialist can 'peg' the market in an active issue over any appreciable length of time, such as 30 minutes." The low specialist participation rates for active NYSE stocks (see, e.g., Madhavan and Sofianos, 1997) also suggests that validation is unlikely to be a significant factor for our benchmarks. Indeed, our results also hold for other benchmarks, including the 10:00 a.m. midquote and the same day closing price. In equation (21), the signed specialist opening trade (the dependent variable) is measured as a percentage of average daily volume for the stock, while specialist opening inventory is expressed as a ratio of inventory over the average daily share volume for the stock. Finally, we scale the price variables by taking log transformations.
Instrumental Variables Estimates
The results in Table 3 provide strong support for the model. In particular, the specialist's expected return is positive and significant when estimated using data for all stocks. The coefficient is positive for all deciles of trading activity, but significance levels are lower, possibly because of the smaller number of observations in the decile regressions. Since the specialist will tend to buy (sell) when this conditional expected return is positive (negative), the effect of such speculative trading is to move the opening price in the direction of the value estimate. These results are robust to the choice of instruments.
The coefficient on specialist inventory is negative, as conjectured, and statistically significant for all stocks. Previous studies of specialist behavior using inventory data (see, e.g., Madhavan and Smidt, 1993; and Madhavan and Sofianos, 1997) do not find strong evidence for inventory control during the day. One possibility is that competition from limit order providers (see, e.g., Seppi, 1997) hinders the specialist's ability to layoff his or her unwanted positions during the day.
If so, the opening presents an ideal opportunity to do so when the specialist can not only trade large volumes through his or her ability to determine price, but also has significant informational advantages over other traders. The results here suggest that inventory control is an important element of specialist participation in opening trading. This may explain why studies of intraday specialist behavior fail to detect significant inventory effects even though there must theoretically be a mechanism for dealers to control their inventories to avoid exhausting their finite capital.
As the specialist's inventory at the start of the sample period is not observed, the intercept captures this as well as any desired (or target) inventory positions the specialist maintains. However, the intercepts are not significantly different from zero, possibly because desired inventories are close to zero or because the time-series is relatively short. It is also possible that there are adjustments to inventory (including odd-lot trades, error corrections, off-exchange trades and transfers after hours) that are not captured by our constructed inventory variable.
Finally, there is strong evidence that specialists engage in price stabilization. The coefficient on the return from the previous day's close to the open is highly significant and negative. 14 The specialist will sell (buy) if the stock will open above (below) the previous day's close. Evidence on stabilization is especially interesting because it suggests short-run mean reversion. It may also provide profit opportunities for agents using very short-horizon technical or momentum strategies. In an efficient market, such stabilization is likely to be costly, and the fact that specialists are willing to do so suggests that the reputational costs of failing to comply with the exchange's affirmative obligations are perceived as large.
This raises the larger issue about why stabilization rules exist in the first place, a topic we discuss in detail in the following section.
Do Dealers Speed Price Discovery?
The Relative Contributions to Price Discovery
An important question is whether the specialist's presence speeds price discovery at the open.
As shown above, there is strong evidence that specialist trades reflect an information factor. Since specialist purchases (sales) are associated with positive (negative) expected returns, the specialist's actions might facilitate price discovery. But dealer trades also reflect other factors including price continuity and inventory control. These non-informational motives could add noise to the opening price, confounding price discovery as shown by equation (15) of our theoretical model. The effect of specialist trading on price discovery is an empirical question.
We begin with a direct test of the relative predictive power of the opening and system-clearing prices. Specifically, we are interested in whether the price set by the specialist is a better estimate of future value than the price if specialist trading were constrained to zero. Table 4 presents results of a two-stage regression analysis of opening prices on the midquote at 3 p.m. on the same day. The model estimated is: should have no explanatory power with respect to the estimated residuals in equation (23). If this is the case, when we use p i t , 2 as the independent variable in equation (22) and p i t , 1 in equation (23), the estimated coefficient of p i t , 2 should be non-zero. Accordingly, we estimate the model twice, reversing the order of the two prices used as independent variables. Later, we use the limit-clearing price instead of the system-clearing price to differentiate the information content of market-on-open orders from limit orders. We estimate the models in return form to avoid econometric problems induced by possible non-stationarity in price levels. We use the same-day 3:00 p.m. midquote as our benchmark of future value. Table 4 summarizes the results of this estimation. We estimate the model for the 89 stocks for which the system-clearing price is defined on 30 or more days; the estimates without this filter are, however, very similar and are not reported. We report average coefficient estimates, average standard errors, and the average R 2 across all stocks and for the most active stock decile 10. We also report the percentage of stocks for which 1 ≠ use the system-clearing price while panels C and D use the limit-clearing price as the market-clearing price. Consider first panel A. In the first stage, using the specialist opening price as the independent variable, the model is consistent with the opening price being an unbiased predictor of the future price.
In the second-stage, the system-clearing price has little explanatory power over the residuals from the first-stage estimation using the specialist's opening price. In fact, only 10.2 percent of stocks had i δŝ ignificantly different from zero in the second stage.
The converse, however, is not true. When the system price is used in the first stage as the independent variable, the explanatory power of the regression is much lower, indicating a poorer fit. Further, the coefficient on the system-clearing price is well below unity. When the residuals from a re-regression of future value on the system-clearing price are regressed in turn on the opening price, the coefficient is significantly different from zero for 63.6 percent of stocks. The results are quite similar when we use the limit-clearing price, and are robust to the use of other benchmark prices including the same-day 10:00 a.m. midquote and the closing price.
Variance Ratio Tests
The results above show that the opening price set by the specialist has significant predictive power beyond the system-clearing price, but that the reverse is not the case. A related question concerns the distribution of opening and system-clearing prices around future value, i.e., the issue of price efficiency.
Recall that in the market clearing price p v * = + 0 ω , where ω is a stochastic disturbance term (system pricing error) with mean zero. Similarly, we can also write the opening price as p v
where ε is a noise term (opening pricing error) with an unconditional mean of zero. The question is then whether the variance of ω exceeds that of ε; we can answer this question by comparing the variance of the opening price around a suitable future price to the variance of the system-clearing price around the same benchmark price.
Denote by σ W 2 and σ 0 2 the variance of the system pricing (Walrasian) and opening pricing er- price, p 0 is the opening price, and p* is the system-clearing price. For days with no opening call market, p 0 is the opening midquote. We report results using the midquote at 3:00 p.m. on the same day as our estimate of future value. The results are robust to the use of other prices including the same-day 10:00 a.m. midquote and the closing price.
To begin with, consider the conventional variance ratio σ W 2 /σ 0 2 , defined as:
The average statistic for all stock days for which there were call opens is 8.16, which is economically large. We computed the percentage of stocks for which the variance of the system pricing errors σ W 2 is significantly greater than or less than the corresponding variance of the opening pricing error σ 0 2 in a one-sided test. The percentage of stock days for which σ σ Similar findings hold for the individual deciles. Thus, the variance of the system-clearing price is both economically and statistically much greater than the variance of the opening price.
Conventional variance ratio tests could suffer from econometric problems arising from (a) overlapping observations, (b) cross stock-correlations, and (c) serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the return series. Ronen (1997) proposes a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) test that addresses these problems. While her approach was developed to test the properties of return variances over trading and non-trading periods (see also George and Hwang, 1997) , the GMM methodology can be readily applied to this problem.
Specifically, given N stocks we form a matrix of 2N moment conditions given by: Lagrange Multiplier test) is that we compute individual variance ratios for each stock while jointly testing the null hypothesis. Table 5 summarizes the results of the GMM estimation for all stocks and for the top decile by dollar trading volume. For all stocks, the estimated average variance ratio using the GMM procedure was 8.49 using the system-clearing price with a Wald statistic of 152.7 which implies rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level. 15 Using the limit clearing price, the corresponding ratio for all stocks is only 6.52 (with a Wald statistic of 115.9) indicating that market-on-open orders contribute more, on average, to the noise in the Walrasian price than limit orders. Thus, our results support our conjecture that market-on-open imbalances are a source of noise that the specialist is able to filter out through a signal extraction process. Similar results hold for quote opens when there was a meaningful system clearing price, supporting the view that it is the specialist's presence that speeds price discovery. 16 Since the figures for all stocks may be misleading for the reasons discussed above, we also report figures for the top decile of stocks. 17 Using all stock-days when there was a batch opening for the most active stocks in the sample, the corresponding variance ratios are similar to those reported above.
As discussed earlier, specialists provide indicated prices to floor participants and regional specialists when the market clearing price differs substantially from the previous day's closing price. In this case, strategic order cancellation could make our definition of a market clearing price essentially meaningless. To include such a possibility, we redo the variance ratios using only those stock-days when the system-clearing price is within a specified range from the previous day's closing price. We consider two values for the range − within 10% and within three dollars of the previous day's close. The GMM estimate of the variance ratio for call markets is 2.4 with a Wald statistic of 166.5 using the systemclearing price. Using the limit-clearing prices, the variance ratio is 3.2 with a Wald statistic of 47.3.
These ratios are significantly smaller than the corresponding unconditional ratios, as expected. We can nonetheless reject the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level. These results suggest that our conclusions are robust to other, narrower definitions of market clearing. They are also consistent with the results of Kehr, Krahnen, and Theissen (1998) who perform a similar comparison using order level data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
In summary, the results in Table 4 and from the variance ratio tests constitute strong evidence that the specialist sets more efficient prices than would prevail otherwise in a pure auction, especially for the more active stocks. This is consistent with our model where the specialist obtains short-run private information about asset prices from observing the limit order book.
Profitability of Specialist Opening Trades
To assess the value of the specialist's short-term information, we also computed the ex post returns for buys and sells. We estimated both unweighted and specialist dollar volume-weighted re- 16 The ratios for the system and limit clearing prices in quote openings are 15.1 and 11.3 with Wald statistics of 80.0 and 115.4, respectively. 17 Less active stocks have higher variance ratios and conventional tests easily reject the null hypothesis.
turns. One issue in computing profits concerns the benchmark price against which returns are evaluated.
The most reasonable benchmark price is one which corresponds closest to the actual holding period, but this is unfortunately not observed. Accordingly, we computed ex post returns for a variety of benchmarks including the 10:00 a.m. midquote, the 3:00 p.m. midquote, and the closing price. Since the results were similar for different benchmarks, we report the results using the 10 a.m. midquote.
Although specialist opening purchases (sales) are associated with positive (negative) returns (measured as log price difference between the 10 a.m. midquote price and the opening price) for almost all stocks and across all deciles of trading volume, only the unweighted measures were significantly different from zero. In particular, the mean ex post unweighted return after specialist purchases was 0.24 percent (with a standard error of 0.04 percent), while after specialist sales, it was -0.19 percent (with a standard error of 0.04 percent). The dollar-weighted ex post mean returns were 0.10 percent (with a standard error of 0.17 percent) and 0.05 percent (with a standard error of 0.17 percent) for specialist buys and sells respectively. The return figures were quite similar for the other two benchmarks. These relatively modest returns are consistent with the evidence reported by Sofianos (1995) who estimates specialist gross trading profits using NYSE audit-trail data.
The results suggest that the specialist's informational advantages identified in the IV estimation do not necessarily translate into large profits at the open. There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, price stabilization is costly since it implies some element of 'leaning against the wind.' Second, the specialist faces direct competition from floor traders and indirect competition in the form of participation orders, as described by Sofianos and Werner (1997) . The presence of strategic traders could substantially erode the profitability of the specialist's opening trade , as shown in Section 2.4
above. Third, risk aversion might limit the extent to which the specialist is willing to take large positions based on information. Finally, specialists concerned about exchange scrutiny may avoid trading aggressively on their informational advantages for fear of creating the appearance of impropriety.
Economic Implications
Our results have direct economic implications for extant security markets and proposed trading systems. Interest in single-price auctions is partly motivated by the belief that they efficiently aggregate the diverse information received by traders. Theoretical models support this intuition. Madhavan (1992) shows that call markets can overcome information asymmetries, yielding more efficient price dis-covery than continuous bilateral systems. These results underlie arguments for the wider use of call markets (see, e.g., Economides and Schwartz, 1995; Schwartz and Wood, 1995) suggests that high levels of transparency may result in gaming, manipulation, and an unwillingness to display liquidity. For example, if order cancellation is not costly there are incentives to game or manipulate opening prices to profit from trading in the subsequent continuous market. Revealing identity of traders behind such cancellations can partly dampen gaming because of loss of reputation within the trading community. Alternatively, gaming could be discouraged by increasing the costs for late cancellations or by other such means. For example, the TSE has adopted so-called "anti-scooping" rules that flag limit orders submitted in the two minutes prior to the open for review, possibly resulting in incomplete fills, and hence discouraging gaming.
The strong results concerning price stabilization raise the natural question as to why such rules exist in the first place and why they are taken seriously. Dutta and Madhavan (1995) argue theoretically that such rules could arise as a rational response by an exchange facing limited communication technolo-gies. In the past, off-floor traders could not obtain current market information when submitting their orders. Price continuity rules provide some assurance that the investor's order will execute at a price near that of the previous day's close, a datum almost certain to be known at the time of order submission. In the event that the opening price will depart substantially from the previous day's close, the specialist is required to put out "indicated" prices and allow time for off-floor traders to revise their orders, mitigating the lack of transparency facing off-exchange traders. This factor might explain the importance accorded to these rules by specialists and the investor community at large. Price stabilization rules also act as a check on the informational advantage possessed by market makers limiting their ability to take advantage of transitory order imbalances. Indeed, the theoretical analysis of Section 2.4 shows that price stabilization is costly and can mitigate the considerable advantages conferred on the specialist.
While our analyses shed light on the role of transparency and dealer intervention in call markets, it is important to keep in mind that we do not examine the question of optimal mechanism design. The behavior of traders is endogenously determined, so that a change in the level of transparency may affect order submission strategies and hence ultimate outcomes. In particular, our results do not address the issue of price efficiency in a transparent call market where investors can observe the evolution of the limit order book, as does the specialist, in the pre-opening period. If such information were available, the specialist's informational advantage would disappear and all traders would share his or her estimate of value. With competition from floor traders (see, e.g., Section 2.4), prices would be more informative, but specialist profits would be diminished. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) note that price efficiency may be enhanced if traders could either observe or somehow condition their orders on the information available to floor participants, including information about demand conditions in other stocks. Wohl and Kandel (1997) provide a theoretical model of such a market where traders can submit complex demand schedules that condition on a particular security's price as well as the market as a whole. Their results suggest that there may be efficiency gains to such a mechanism. Ultimately, technology will enable traders to place such orders, as in the case of OptiMark Inc. Unfortunately, empirical studies are ultimately limited in examining questions of this nature, but experimental methods (see, e.g., Bloomfield and O'Hara, 1997, and Schnitzlein, 1997) offer considerable promise in this regard. These questions lie beyond the scope of this paper, but are exciting topics for future research.
Conclusions
Financial economists have long been interested in how trading mechanisms translate investors' latent demands into realized prices and quantities. Yet important aspects of price formation are still not well understood, including key questions concerning the role of dealers and the effects of transparency.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by studying, both theoretically and empirically, the process of price formation in the NYSE single-price auction.
Theoretically, we show that a designated dealer can facilitate price discovery in an auction mechanism. A dealer who observes the evolution and components of the limit order book in the preopening period performs a signal extraction function that can result in a more efficient price. Dealer trading for non-informational reasons, such as inventory control or price continuity, may offset this factor. Thus, the net impact of dealers on the informational efficiency of prices is an empirical question.
We use order-level data to investigate this question empirically. Interestingly, although a batch market without dealer intervention is feasible for 92 percent of the stock-days in our sample, a batch mechanism is only used for 67 percent of stock-days. However, there is strong evidence that the NYSE's designated dealer (specialist) sets a more efficient price than the price that would prevail in a pure call market using only public orders. This is consistent with our model where the specialist obtains valuable information from observing the evolution of the limit order book. We also show that the specialist's opening trade reflects information about future asset values as well as concerns over inventory control and price continuity. The results yield insights into the design of exchange openings as well as the operation of auction markets. 
